Arguing on the Internet is a lot like...
Now, these statements are in such stark contrariety to the truth that they could only have come from someone with a long-formed view of Andrew Sullivan; someone who doesn't, therefore, need to actually read his site in order to divine his opinion on whatever situation we're facing. Either that, or an illiterate; I'm giving Ace the dubious benefit of some minimal doubt here. Regardless, this kind of cavalier attitude towards fact is something of a pet peeve of mine, and so I left a comment under the name 'Dudefella' (long story) pointing out that Sullivan, whether you agree with him or not, had been consistent in his view that at least 50,000 troops would be needed, and had been saying so for some time before the actual deployment figures were announced.
Mistake.
After comments calling me a sock-puppet, correcting my incredulity at the FMA crack (apparently evidence of Ace's perceptiveness), and some crude "humour" involving Sullivan's likely "position" on a "surge", I left another comment observing that Ace's statement was "demonstrably false". At this point I had started to regret breaking my self-imposed moratorium on comment-posting, cursing myself for failing to heed the cruel-yet-wise advice of old chain-email jokes - when suddenly a clarion call sounded from "Toby928":
"Feel free to demonstrate it."
Mistake.
Ordinarily it's the person making the allegation who's supposed to demonstrate the accuracy of the charge, but so be it. I would warn you, Ace and Toby, before I start, to prepare yourself for just how thoroughly you're about to be Fisked. I'm not being facetious. This might actually break some bones.
November 30th, a week before the ISG report was released:
"My preference is for a draw-down of troops in Shiite and Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, a redeployment to Kurdistan where they like us and whence we can keep an eye on any egregious terrorist activities in Anbar, and a much bigger force presence in Baghdad to prevent the capital from imploding. If the Shiite militias want to fight it out for control of Southern Iraq, fine."
He quantifies what he means by "a much bigger force presence" on December 2nd:
"How much higher would make a difference? At this point, close to 50,000 to 100,000 extra troops to halt the centrifugal force of societal disintegration in Iraq."
You'll also note that in this post - far from changing his tune as soon as Bush announced the actual deployment figures - he comments upon a hypothetical (at the time) commitment of 20,000 extra troops:
"Would, say, another 20,000 troops work in a pitched battle with Sadrite forces to retake parts of Baghdad? Unlikely - and with massive casualties probably prompting an uprising in the South. Anbar is all but gone. The South is a battleground for various Shiite militias and sending U.S. troops in to police the conflict is madness. But even if you reduced troops in the South and West, and focused on 20,000 more troops just for Baghdad, it's a stretch. As even Fred Kagan acknowledges."
... and reinforces his position as follows:
"We need at least 50,000 NOW."
Now, I would assume the fact that Sullivan called for 50,000+ troops in any potential surge - and explicitly opposed a token commitment of 20,000 troops - before the administration even began publicly promoting the idea of a surge and almost six weeks before the numbers were released, is enough to quash the notion that his position changed as soon as Bush stepped onto the podium. I'm still working on the relevance of the FMA to any of this, but I suspect Ace might be the only one who can enlighten us on that front. Just in case this isn't enough to satisfy you, here's a few further examples; I've only included cases where he specifically cites numbers, but all his posts regarding Iraq troops levels and policy operate under these established figures.
December 4th, in response to a vague proposal from Rich Lowry regarding troop levels:
"From where? How many? 50,000 now? I could go on. Actually, I have gone on and on and on."
December 7th, just after the ISG report was released:
"So we have two awful options, it seems to me. First: throw everything we've got at this thing, do all the Baker-Hamilton commission wants (including the Iran and Syria gambits) except withdraw troops... the acid test will be [Bush's] troop commitment. He needs to embrace much of Baker-Hamilton and add more than 50,000 and probably closer to 75,000 new troops into the theater - in the next three or four months... If we don't do that, we should leave - rapidly, and let the real war begin."
and again on December 7th:
"Double-down or get out. Those remain the only real options, in my view. Increasingly, I lean toward getting out completely, and finally giving the region the civil and religious war it so obviously and deeply wants... If Bush finds 50,000 to 75,000 troops, we'll know he's serious."
December 13th, as the administration started discussing the possibility of an upcoming surge:
"Trying to find a new governing coalition sans Sadr strikes me as Sysyphean at this point, but I suppose one more push can't hurt. A troop surge might help such an effort, but, again, it's just one last gambit, not a real strategy. But all this looks as if it's in the works. I see, of course, no sign that we are going to seriously reboot the occupation, so all of this is simply a way to minimize the short-term costs of leaving. It's face-saving, which only a huge amount of luck might turn into something better. So try it - but no illusions, please. McCain may do a photo-op with Bush in january, but wihout 50,000 more troops, it's pure theater."
December 13th again:
"My point is that we have every reason not to be in the very middle of this with 130,000 troops."
December 15th:
"Somehow, however, I don't think rearranging the troops with a temporary surge will ever amount to "all that America's might can muster." And there's no evidence that the president is attempting anything much more ambitious. As I said before: if he adds 50,000 more troops, we'll know he's serious."
December 16th, on a strategy proposed by Fred Kagan:
"This proposal looks like it may emerge as the Bush-McCain strategy in Iraq: the double-down strategy aimed at restoring order, critically in Baghdad, before any political solution can be tried. It looks to me in the serious range - 50,000 more troops. If this is presented, and appears to be a real plan for one last attempt to salvage Iraq, I'd be inclined to support it, while remaining still doubtful of its chances for success."
At this point, Sullivan went on holiday for Christmas. This is probably fortunate for you, since - judging by the frequency and consistency with which he was expressing his view of the surge - I'd probably have had an extra half-dozen or so quotes to add right about here. Anyway - let's continue, shall we?
January 2nd, in a post considering the relative costs and benefits of each option:
"One option is to plow forward with this president, a new defense secretary and a "surge". By a surge, I mean a serious commitment of 50,000 combat troops to try and pacify a raging civil war - in Baghdad for starters."
January 4th, in a post entitled "50,000":
"That's the magic number of extra troops needed for a "surge" in Iraq to be credible, according to John Keegan."
January 5th:
"The idea that a surge of 20,000 American troops can or will rectify this situation is unhinged."
January 7th:
"The worst that can be said of David's proposal is that it's far more realistic than the leaked plans of the president. If the "surge" we are contemplating is indeed a mere 20,000 troops and if it is dependent on the pesh merga, and if it is accompanied by a puny $1 billion for reconstruction, then we know one thing: this is not a serious military proposal."
January 8th:
"Even those who favor doubling down are nonetheless skeptical of whether it is feasible, and whether an escalation of a mere 20,000 can do anything but compound the problem. Among those who believe that a minimum of 50,000 more troops are needed are such luminaries as John Keegan, a conservative military scholar. Others suggest up to 100,000."
January 9th:
"But I also believe that a real surge means a minimum of 50,000 more competent, professional soldiers deployed for the indefinite future... McCain, alas, commits himself to a mere minimum of 25,000. Sorry, but no deal. Anything less than 50,000 means more of the same."
January 9th, quoting John McIntyre:
"[A] well-managed retreat would be preferable to a continuation of the status-quo policy of the last 18 months, dressed up under new commanders and 20,000 more troops," - John McIntyre, RealClearPolitics at Time. The president's toughest critics Wednesday night may be pro-war conservatives."
January 9th, regarding an explosive "debate" (complete with death threats) between a Saddam loyalist and a Shia journalist on al Jazeera:
"We are supposed to bring these people together with 20,000 more troops? Who are we kidding?"
January 9th:
"He's saying a minimum of seven more brigades are needed for an indefinite period of time. That translates to roughly 18,000 up to 35,000 more troops as a minimum. I think he's being too modest and we need more. But at least we have a bar to judge the president's speech by."
January 10th, as news of the actual deployment figures was leaked, in a post entitled "21,500":
"That's it, apparently. Phased in slowly, with a mere 10,000 or so Iraqi government soldiers. To retake Baghdad block by block. I'll be fascinated to know if even Fred Kagan thinks this is sufficient... It makes Baker-Hamilton look realistic."
January 10th, just after Bush's speech, in a shocking change of heart:
"If the president tonight had outlined a serious attempt to grapple with this new situation - a minimum of 50,000 new troops as a game-changer - then I'd eagerly be supporting him. But he hasn't. 21,500 U.S. troops is once again, I fear, just enough troops to lose."
So, to summarise: Andrew Sullivan, over the course of the six-odd weeks before the president's announcement, beginning even before the administration had committed themselves to a surge policy, expressed his view that 50,000 troops would be needed to change the current course of the Iraq conflict at least seventeen times. This does not count posts relating to the topic which did not mention precise numbers. Not only that, but on several occasions before the president's announcement, he addressed the possibility of adding 20,000 more troops and declared the figure, in his opinion, insufficient.
Ace's retraction is, I believe, scheduled for five minutes after Hell freezes over.
UPDATE: HIRED GOON - WEDNESDAY JANUARY 31st 2007
More discussion in the comments thread of Ace's I-charitably-use-the-phrase "rebuttal" post here, with me again posting as Dudefella. It's worth reading for some exchanges with Ace's commenters, notably Geoff and JackStraw. The latter somehow seems to mistakenly believe that my argument was that Sullivan thought a surge of 50,000 troops would guarantee success. It was not. I argued that Ace's accusations regarding Sullivan's consistency on troops levels were wrong; I did not argue that Sullivan was of the view that 50,000 troops would immediately ensure a positive outcome, for the simple-but-compelling reason that he was clearly not of that view. From the start, he professed an increasing unease that the situation might already be irrevocable; and that a credibly substantial force commitment - a minimum of 50,000 troops as what he called a "game changer" - would be required to allay his fears sufficiently to support any potential surge. Or, as he himself put it when assessing a proposed plan by Fred Kagan:"It looks to me in the serious range - 50,000 more troops. If this is presented, and appears to be a real plan for one last attempt to salvage Iraq, I'd be inclined to support it, while remaining still doubtful of its chances for success."
This summation of Sullivan's position should have been evident to anyone reading the links I supplied, or even the excerpts I reproduced; the above was quoted directly in my original post. As I noted, for someone who felt comfortable issuing such strongly-worded denunciations of Sullivan's views, JackStraw did seem to be learning them in real-time as the comment thread progressed.
Anyway, since everyone now appears to agree that Sullivan was consistent on troop figures (including Ace, if his anvil-like dropping of the subject is any indication), I assume we can lay that issue to rest. JackStraw's two other main lines of reasoning are that:
- the real topic of Ace's original post was that Sullivan's opposition to Bush is driven by the FMA
- Sullivan intentionally proposed an infeasible plan so as to ensure that he could ultimately oppose Bush
- How could Sullivan have been deliberately setting himself up to disagree with Bush - or at the very least, how could he have known he was doing so - when the position he adopted was the consensus of many prominent commentators at the time? This view of the situation would require Sullivan to be evil, and everyone else insane.
- If Sullivan wanted to pick an implausible number of troops, why did he choose a figure that other people had already proposed (and, moreover, which they had defended as plausible and realistic)? Indeed, why did he pick a number lower than some others suggested?
- If Sullivan's comments regarding his skepticism that the current policy can succeed are unreasonable, why are many others expressing skepticism of precisely the same kind, and for the same reasons?
